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Abstract. In the paper we introduce a process model of security pro-
tocols, where processes are graphs with edges labelled by actions, and
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cols based on this model.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security protocols and their properties
A security protocol (SP) is a distributed algorithm that determines an order
of message passing between several agents. Examples of such agents are computer
systems, bank cards, people, etc. Messages transmitted by SPs can be encrypted.
We assume that encryption transformations used in SPs are perfect, i.e. satisfy
some axioms expressing, for example, an impossibility of extraction of open texts
from ciphertexts without knowing the corresponding cryptographic keys.
In this paper we present a new model of SPs based on Milner’s Calculus
of Communicating Systems [1] and theory of processes with message passing
[2]. This model is a graph analog of a Calculus of Cryptographic Protocols
(spi-calculus, [3]). It can serve as a theoretical foundation for a new method
(presented in the paper) of verification of SPs, where verification means a con-
structing of mathematical proofs that SPs meet the desired properties. Examples
of such properties are integrity and secrecy. These properties are defined for-
mally, as some conditions expressed in terms of an observational equivalence.
1.2 Verification of security protocols
There are examples of SPs ([4]–[8]) which were used in safety-critical systems,
however it turned out that the SPs contain vulnerabilities of the following forms:
– agents involved in these SPs can receive distorted messages (or lose them)
as a result of interception, deletion or distortion of transmitted messages by
an adversary, that violates the integrity property,
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– an adversary can find out a confidential information contained in intercepted
messages as a result of erroneous or fraudulent actions of SP agents.
These examples justify that for SPs used in safety-critical systems it is not
enough informal analysis of required properties, it is necessary
– to build a mathematical model of an analyzed SP,
– to describe security properties of the analyzed SP as mathematical objects
(e.g. graphs, or logical formulas), called a formal specification, and
– to construct a mathematical proof that the analyzed SP meets (or does not
meet) the formal specification, this proof is called a formal verification.
In the process model described in the paper SPs and their formal speci-
fications are represented by processes with message passing. Many important
properties of SPs (in particular, integrity and secrecy) can be expressed as ob-
servational equivalence of such processes.
One of the most significant advantages of the proposed process model of SPs
is a low complexity of proofs of correctness of SPs. In particular, there is no need
to build a set of all reachable states of analyzed SPs, if the set of all these states
and transmitted messages is unbounded.
Among other models of SPs most popular are logical models ([9]–[13]). These
models provide possibility to reduce the problem of verification of SPs to the
problem of proofs of theorems that analyzed SPs meet their specifications. Al-
gebraic and logical approaches to verification are considered also in [14]–[16].
2 Description of a process model of security protocols
In the process model described below SPs and formal specifications of their prop-
erties are represented by graphs, whose edges are labeled by actions. Actions
are expressions consisting of terms and formulas.
2.1 Variables, constants, terms
We assume that there are given a set X of variables, a subset K ⊆ X of keys,
and a set C of constants. A set E of terms is defined inductively:
– ∀x ∈ X , ∀ c ∈ C x and c are terms,
– for each list e1, . . . , en of terms the record e1 . . . en is a term,
(if the above list is empty, then the corresponding term is denoted by ε),
– ∀ k ∈ K, ∀ e ∈ E the record k(e) is a term (called an encrypted message
(EM), this term represents a result of an encryption of e on the key k).
Terms are designed for a representation of messages transmitted between
participants of communications, a term of the form e1 . . . en represents a compos-
ite message consisting of messages corresponding to the components e1, . . . , en.
∀ e ∈ E the set of variables occurred in e is denoted by Xe. If terms e, e′ have
the form e1, . . . , en and e
′
1, . . . , e
′
n′ , respectively, then the record ee
′ denotes the
term e1, . . . , ene
′
1, . . . , e
′
n′ , and ∀ e ∈ E εe = eε = e.
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2.2 Formulas
Elementary formulas (EFs) are records of the form e = e′ and e ∈ E (where
e, e′ ∈ E , and E is a subset of E). A formula is a conjunction of EFs. The symbols
⊤ and ⊥ denote true and false formulas respectively (for example, ⊤ = (c1 = c1),
⊥ = (c1 = c2), where c1 and c2 are different constants). A set of formulas is
denoted by B. ∀ b ∈ B Xb is a set of all variables occurring in b.
∀ b1, b2 ∈ B b1 ≤ b2 means that b2 is a logical consequence of b1 (where the
concept of a logical consequence is defined by a standard way).
If b1 ≤ b2 and b2 ≤ b1, then b1 and b2 are assumed to be equal.
∀ k, k′ ∈ K, ∀ e, e′ ∈ E the formulas k(e) = k′(e′) and (k = k′) ∧ (e = e′) are
assumed to be equal. The records e1 =b e2 and b ∈b E means that b ≤ (e1 = e2)
and b ≤ (e ∈ E) respectively.
2.3 Closed sets of terms
Let E ⊆ E and b ∈ B. The set E is said to be b–closed if
–
(
∀ i = 1, . . . , n ei ∈ E
)
⇔ e1 . . . en ∈ E,
– ∀ k ∈ E ∩ K
(
e ∈ E ⇔ k(e) ∈ E
)
,
– ∀ e, e′ ∈ E (e =b e′) ⇒
(
e ∈ E ⇔ e′ ∈ E
)
.
Closed sets of terms are used for representation of sets of messages which can
be known to an adversary. The above conditions correspond to operations which
an adversary A can perform with his available messages:
– if A has e1, . . . , en, then it can compose the message e1 . . . en,
– if A has e1 . . . en, then it may get its components e1, . . ., en,
– if A has k and e, where k is a key, then it can create a EM k(e),
– if A has an EM k(e) and a key k, then it can decrypt k(e), i.e. get e.
Theorem 1. ∀E ⊆ E , ∀ b ∈ B there is a least (w.r.t. an inclusion of sets)
b–closed set Eb ⊆ E , such that E ⊆ Eb.
Let D1, D2 ⊆ E , and b1, b2 ∈ B. A binary relation µ ⊆ D
b1
1 ×D
b2
2 is said to
be a similarity between (D1, b1) and (D2, b2), if ∀ (e1, e2) ∈ µ
– ∀ e′1, e
′
2 ∈ E (e
′
1, e2) ∈ µ⇔ (e1 =b1 e
′
1), (e1, e
′
2) ∈ µ⇔ (e2 =b2 e
′
2),
– the conditions ∃ e1i , . . . , e
n
i ∈ D
bi
i : (ei =bi e
1
i . . . e
n
i ) (i = 1, 2) are equivalent,
and if these conditions hold, then ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (ei1, e
i
2) ∈ µ,
– the conditions ∃ ki, e′i ∈ D
bi
i : (ei =bi ki(e
′
i)) (i = 1, 2) are equivalent, and if
these conditions hold, then (k1, k2) ∈ µ and (e′1, e
′
2) ∈ µ.
A set of all similarities between (D1, b1) and (D2, b2) is denoted by the record
Sim
(
(D1, b1), (D2, b2)
)
.
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2.4 Actions
An action is a record of one of the three kinds: an input, an output, an internal
action. Inputs and outputs are associated with an execution, defined below.
– An input is an action of the form e?e′, where e, e′ ∈ E . An execution of
this action consists of a receiving a message through a channel named e, and
writing components of this message to variables occurring in e′.
– An output is an action of the form e!e′, where e, e′ ∈ E . An execution of
this action consists of a sending a message e′ through a channel named e.
– An internal action is an action of the form b, where b ∈ B.
The set of all actions is denoted by A, ∀ a ∈ A a set of variables occurred in
a is denoted by Xa.
2.5 Processes with a message passing
Processes with a message passing are intended for description of SPs and formal
specifications of their properties.
A process with a message passing (called below briefly as a process) is
a tuple P = (S, s0, R, b0, D0, H0), where
– S is a set of states, s0 ∈ S is an initial state,
– R ⊆ S×A×S is a set of transitions, each transition (s, a, s′) ∈ R is denoted
by the record s
a
→ s′,
– b0 ∈ B is an initial condition,
– D0 ⊆ E is a set of disclosed terms, values of these terms are known to
both the process P and the environment at the initial moment, and
– H0 ⊆ X is a set of hidden variables.
A set of all processes is denoted by P , ∀P ∈ P the records SP , s0P , RP , b
0
P ,
D0P , H
0
P denote the corresponding components of P . A set of variables occurring
in P is denoted by XP . A process P such that RP = ∅ is denoted by 0.
A transition s
a
→ s′ is said to be an input, an output, or an internal
transition, if a is an input, an output, or an internal action, respectively.
A process P can be represented as a graph (denoted by the same symbol P ):
its nodes are states from SP , and edges are corresponded to transitions from
RP : each transition s
a
→ s′ corresponds to an edge from s1 to s2 labelled by a.
We assume that for each process P under consideration the graph P is acyclic.
2.6 An execution of a process
An execution of a process P ∈ P can be informally understood as a walk on
the graph P starting from s0P , with an execution of actions that are labels of
traversed edges. At each step i ≥ 0 of this walk there are defined
– a state si ∈ SP of the process P at the moment i,
– a condition bi ∈ B on variables of P at the moment i, and
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– a set Di ⊆ E of disclosed messages at the moment i, i.e. messages known
to both the process P and the environment at the moment i.
An execution of a process P ∈ P is a sequence of the form
(s0P , b
0
P , D
0
P ) = (s0, b0, D0)
a1→ (s1, b1, D1)
a2→ . . .
an→ (sn, bn, Dn)
where ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (si−1
ai→ si) ∈ RP , (bi, Di) = (bi−1, Di−1)ai, and
∀ b ∈ B, D ⊆ E , a ∈ A (b,D)a =


(b,D ∪ {e}), if a = d?e or d!e, where d ∈ Db,
(b ∧ a,D), if a ∈ B,
undefined, otherwise.
We assume that a value of each variable x ∈ H0P is unique and unknown to
an environment of P at the initial moment of any execution of P .
A set of all executions of P can be represented by a labelled tree TP , where
– a root t0P of the tree TP is labelled by the triple (s
0
P , b
0
P , D
0
P ), and
– if the set of edges of P outgoing from s0P is {s
0
P
ai→ si | i = 1, . . . ,m}, then
for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, such that ∃ (bi, Di) = (b
0
P , D
0
P )ai,
• TP has an edge of the form t0P
ai→ ti, and
• a subtree growing from ti is TPi , where Pi = (SP , si, RP , bi, Di, H
0
P \D
bi
i ).
The set of nodes of TP is denoted by the same record TP . For each node
t ∈ TP the records st, bt, Dt denote corresponding components of a label of t.
∀ t, t′ ∈ TP the record t → t
′ means that either t = t′, or there is a path in
TP of the form t = t0
a1→ t1
a2→ . . .
am→ tm = t′, where a1, . . . , am ∈ B.
2.7 Observational equivalence of processes
In this section we introduce a concept of observational equivalence of processes.
This concept has the following sense: processes P1 and P2 are observationally
equivalent iff for any external observer (which can observe a behavior of P1 and
P2 by sending and receiving messages) these processes are indistinguishable.
An example of a pair of observationally equivalent processes is the pair
Pi = ({s
0
i , si}, s
0
i , { s0i
✲c ! ki(ei) si },⊤, {c}, {ki}) (i = 1, 2). (1)
P1 and P2 send a unique message via channel c and then terminate. Any process
observing an execution of P1 and P2 is unable to distinguish them.
Processes P1, P2 ∈ P , are said to be observationally equivalent iff there
is a binary relation µ ⊆ TP1 × TP2 satisfying the following conditions:
1. ∀ (t1, t2) ∈ µ ∃µt1,t2 ∈ Sim
(
(Dt1 , bt1), (Dt2 , bt2)
)
,
2. (t0P1 , t
0
P2
) ∈ µ, ∀ (d1, d2) ∈ µt0
P1
,t0
P2
∃ d ∈ E : di =b0
Pi
d (i = 1, 2),
3. ∀ (t1, t2) ∈ µ, for each edge t1
a1→ t′1, ∃ t
′
2 ∈ TP2 : (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ µ, µt1,t2 ⊆ µt′1,t′2 ,
– if a1 = d1 ⊲ e1 (⊲ ∈ {?, !}), then ∃ t, t′ ∈ TP2 : t2 → t, t
′ → t′2, and ∃ d2, e2:
t
d2⊲e2→ t′, (d1, d2) ∈ µt′
1
,t′
2
, (e1, e2) ∈ µt′
1
,t′
2
,
– if a1 ∈ B, then t2 → t′2,
4. a condition which is symmetric to condition 3: for each pair (t1, t2) ∈ µ, and
each edge t2
a2→ t′2 there is a node t
′
1 ∈ TP1 , such that (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ µ, etc.
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For example, processes Pi (i = 1, 2) from (1) are observationally equivalent,
because in this case TPi has the form (si0,⊤, {c})
✲c ! ki(ei) (si,⊤, {c, ki(ei)}) , and
the required µ is {(s01, s1), (s
0
2, s2)}.
2.8 Operations on processes
In this section we define operations on processes which can be used for a con-
struction of complex processes from simpler ones.
Prefix action ∀ a ∈ A, ∀P ∈ P [a]P is a process defined as follows:
S[a]P
def
= {s} ⊔ SP , s0[a]P
def
= s, R[a]P
def
= {s
a
→ s0P } ⊔RP ,
b0[a]P
def
= b0P , D
0
[a]P
def
= Xa ∪D0P , H
0
[a]P
def
= H0P .
An execution of [a]P can be informally understood as follows: at first the
action a is executed, then [a]P is executed just like P .
Choice ∀P1, P2 ∈ P P1 + P2 is a process defined as follows: all states of P1,
that also belong to SP2 , are replaced by fresh states, and
SP1+P2
def
= {s} ⊔ SP1 ⊔ SP2 , s
0
P1+P2
def
= s,
RP1+P2
def
= RP1 ⊔RP2 ⊔ {s
a
→ s′ | (s0Pi
a
→ s′) ∈ RPi , i ∈ {1, 2}},
b0P1+P2
def
= b0P1 ∧ b
0
P2
, D0P1+P2
def
= D0P1 ∪D
0
P2
, H0P1+P2
def
= H0P1 ∪H
0
P2
.
An execution of P1 + P2 can be understood as follows: at first it is selected
(non-deterministically) a process Pi ∈ {P1, P2} which can execute its first action,
and then P1 + P2 is executed as the selected process.
Parallel composition ∀P1, P2 ∈ P (P1, P2) is a process defined as follows:
all variables in XP1 \D
0
P1
, that also belong to XP2 \D
0
P2
, are replaced by fresh
variables, and
– S(P1,P2)
def
= SP1 × SP2 , s
0
(P1,P2)
def
= (s0P1 , s
0
P2
),
– R(P1,P2) consists of the following transitions:
• (s1, s2)
a
→ (s′1, s2), where (s1
a
→ s′1) ∈ RP1 , s2 ∈ SP2 ,
• (s1, s2)
a
→ (s1, s′2), where s1 ∈ SP1 , (s2
a
→ s′2) ∈ RP2 ,
• (s1, s2) ✲
(d1=d2)∧(e1=e2)
(s′1, s
′
2) , where (si
ai→ s′i) ∈ RPi (i = 1, 2),
{a1, a2} = {d1!e1, d2?e2} (such transition is said to be diagonal),
– b0(P1,P2)
def
= b0P1 ∧ b
0
P2
, D0(P1,P2)
def
= D0P1 ∪D
0
P2
, H0(P1,P2)
def
= H0P1 ⊔H
0
P2
.
An execution of (P1, P2) can be understood as undeterministic interleaving
of executions of P1 and P2: at each moment of an execution of (P1, P2)
– either one of P1, P2 executes an action, and another is in waiting,
– or one of P1, P2 sends a message, and another receives this message.
A process (. . . (P1, P2), . . . , Pn) is denoted by (P1, . . . , Pn).
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Replication ∀P ∈ P a replication of P is a process P∧ that can be understood
as infinite parallel composition (P, P, . . .), and is defined as follows.
∀ i ≥ 1 let Pi be a process which is obtained from P by renaming of variables:
∀x ∈ XP \ D
0
P each occurrence of x in P is replaced by the variable xi, such
that all the variables xi are fresh. Components of P
∧ have the following form:
– SP∧
def
= {(s1, s2, . . .) | ∀ i ≥ 1 si ∈ SP }, s
0
P∧
def
= (s0P , s
0
P , . . .),
– ∀ (s1, . . .) ∈ SP∧ , ∀ i ≥ 1, ∀ (si
a
→ s) ∈ RPi RP∧ contains the transitions
• (s1, . . .)
a
→ (s1, . . . , si−1, s, si+1, . . .), and
• (s1, . . .) ✲
(d1=d2)∧(e1=e2)
(s1, . . . , si−1, s, si+1, . . . , sj−1, s
′, sj+1, . . .) , where
(sj
a′
→ s′) ∈ RPj for some j 6= i, and {a, a
′} = {d1!e1, d2?e2},
– b0P∧
def
= b0P , D
0
P∧
def
= D0P , H
0
P∧
def
=
⊔
i≥1H
0
Pi
.
Hiding ∀P ∈ P , ∀X ⊆ X PX
def
= (SP , s
0
P , RP , b
0
P , D
0
P \X,H
0
P ∪X).
If X = {x1, . . . , xn}, then PX is denoted by Px1,...,xn .
Theorem 2. Observational congruence preserves operations of prefix action,
parallel composition, replication and hiding.
2.9 A sufficient condition of an observational equivalence
Let P ∈ P . A labeling of states of P is a set {(bs, Ds) | s ∈ S}, such that
– S ⊆ SP , ∀ s ∈ S bs ∈ B and Ds ⊆ E , s0P ∈ S, bs0P = b
0
P , Ds0P = D
0
P ,
– for each transition (s
a
→ s′) ∈ RP , if s′ ∈ S then s ∈ S, and in this case
• if a = d ⊲ e, where ⊲ ∈ {?, !}, then d ∈ Dbss , bs ≤ bs′ , Ds ∪ {e} ⊆ D
bs′
s′ ,
• if a ∈ B, then bs ∧ a ≤ bs′ and Ds ⊆ Ds′ .
∀ s, s′ ∈ SP the record s → s′ means that either s = s′, or there is a set of
thansitions of the form s = s0
a1→ s1
a2→ . . .
am→ sm = s′, where a1, . . . , am ∈ B.
Theorem 3 (a sufficient condition of an observational equivalence).
Let P1, P2 ∈ P , where SP1 ∩ SP2 = ∅. Then P1 ≈ P2, if there are a binary
relation µ ⊆ SP1 ×SP2 and labelings {(bs, Ds) | s ∈ SP1}, {(bs, Ds) | s ∈ SP2} of
states of P1 and P2 respectively, such that
1. each pair (s1, s2) ∈ µ is associated with µs1s2 ∈ Sim
(
(Ds1 , bs1), (Ds2 , bs2)
)
,
2. (s0P1 , s
0
P2
) ∈ µ, and each element of the set µ0
def
= µs0
P1
s0
P2
has the form (x, x),
where x ∈ D0P1 ∩D
0
P2
,
3. for each pair (s1, s2) ∈ µ, and each transition (s1
a1→ s′1) ∈ RP1 there is a
state s′2 ∈ SP2 , such that (s
′
1, s
′
2) ∈ µ, µs1s2 ⊆ µs′1s′2 , and
– if a1 is input or output, then a1 = x ⊲ e1, where ⊲ ∈ {?, !}, (x, x) ∈ µ0,
∃ s, s′ ∈ SP2 : s2 → s, s
′ → s′2, ∃ e2: s
x⊲e2→ s′, (e1, e2) ∈ µs′
1
s′
2
,
– if a1 ∈ B, then s2 → s′2,
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4. a condition which is symmetric to condition 3: for each pair (s1, s2) ∈ µ and
each transition s2
a2→ s′2, ∃ s
′
1 ∈ SP1 : (s
′
1, s
′
2) ∈ µ, etc.
Theorem 4. Let P be a process, {(Ds, bs) | s ∈ S} be a labelling of P , and
RP has an edge s
a
→ s′ such that s, s′ ∈ S, and a has the form d?k(e), where
Dbss does not contain k and any term of the form k(e
′). Then P ≈ P ′, where P ′
is obtained from P by removing the above edge and all unreachable (from s0P )
states which appear after removing the edge.
3 Security protocols
A security protocol (SP) is a process P ∈ P of the form (P1, . . . , Pn)X , where
P1, . . . , Pn are processes corresponding to agents involved in the SP, and X ⊆ X
is a shared secret of the agents. In this section we present an application of the
proposed approach to description, specification of properties and verification of
several examples of SPs, all of them are analogs of examples from [3].
3.1 A message passing through a hidden channel
First example is a simplest SP for a message passing through a hidden channel.
This SP consists of a sending of a message x from an agent a to an agent
b through a channel named c (where only a and b know the name c of this
channel), b receives the message and stores it in variable y, then b behaves like
a process P . This SP is represented by the diagram
✲
a b
P
c : x
A behavior of a and b is represented by processes A and B respectively,
A
def
= [c !x]0, B
def
= [c ?y]P (where c 6∈ P ). The SP is represented by the process
Sys
def
= (A,B)c. Graph representations of processes in Sys is the following:
– process A:
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1✲
c !x
– process B:
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕B0
✓
✒
✏
✑P✲
c ? y
(where
✓
✒
✏
✑P denotes a subgraph corresponded to the process P )
– process (A,B):
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1P
✓
✒
✏
✑A1B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A0P
✲c !x
✲c !x
❄
c ? y
❄
c ? y
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❥
y = x
(where
✓
✒
✏
✑A0P and
✓
✒
✏
✑A1P denote subgraphs corresponded to copies of P (nodes
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of these graphs are denoted by Ais, where i = 0, 1, and s ∈ SP ), and the
arrow from
✓
✒
✏
✑A0P to
✓
✒
✏
✑A1P denotes a set of corresponding transitions from A0s
to A1s, where s ∈ SP ).
On the reason of theorem 4, the process (A,B)c is observationally equivalent
to the process
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1P✲
y = x
.
The process model allows formally describe and verify properties of integrity
and secrecy of the above SP. These properties are as follows.
– An integrity of the SP is the following property: after a completion of the
SP agent b receives the same message that has been sent by agent a.
– A secrecy of the SP is the following property:
• for each pair x1, x2 of messages, which a can send b by this SP, and
• for each two sessions of this SP, where the first session is a passing of x1,
and the second one is a passing of x2,
any external (i.e. different from a and b) agent, observing an execution of
these sessions, is unable to extract from the observed information any knowl-
edge about the messages x1 and x2: whether the messages are the same or
different (unless these knowledges are not disclosed by participants a, b).
More accurately, the secrecy property can be described as follows: for any
pair x1, x2 of messages, which a can send b by an execution of this SP
• if for any external observer the process [y = x1]P (which describes a
behavior of the agent b after receiving x1) is indistinguishable from the
process [y = x2]P (which describes a behavior of b after receiving x2),
• then for any sessions of an execution of this SP, where the first one is
a passing of x1, and the second one is a passing of x2, any external
agent, observing the execution of these sessions, can not determine, are
identical or different messages transmitted in those sessions.
A formal description and verification of the properties of integrity and secrecy
of this SP is as follows.
1. A property of integrity is described by the proposition
Sys ≈ ˜Sys (2)
where ˜Sys describes a SP which is defined like the original SP, but with the
following modification of b: after a receiving a message and storing it in a
fresh variable y′, a value of y is changed on a value that a sent really. A
behavior of modified b is described by the process B˜
def
= [c ?y′] [y = x]P , and
the process ˜Sys has the form (A, B˜)c.
Now we prove (2). The definition of operations on processes implies that
Sys ≈ [y = x]P, ˜Sys ≈ [y′ = x] [y = x]P, (3)
that implies (2), because y′ 6∈ [y = x]P.
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2. A property of secrecy of this SP is described by the implication
[y = x1]P ≈ [y = x2]P ⇒ [x = x1]Sys ≈ [x = x2]Sys
(where x1, x2 are fresh variables).
(4)
Now we prove (4). The the premise of implication (4) implies the statement
[y = x] [y = x1]P ≈ [y = x] [y = x2]P,
which is equivalent to the statement
[x = x1] [y = x]P ≈ [x = x2] [y = x]P. (5)
(5) and first proposition in (3) imply
[x = x1]Sys ≈ [x = x1] [y = x]P ≈ [x = x2] [y = x]P ≈ [x = x2]Sys.
3.2 A SP with a creation of a new channel
Second SP consists of a message passing from a to b, with an assumption that
a channel for this passing should be created during the execution of the SP. An
auxiliary agent t is used in the SP (t is a trusted intermediary), and it is assumed
that a name of a created channel must be known only to a, b, and t.
This SP is represented by the diagram
✲
✲
✲
a t b
P
ca : c
cb : c
c : x
A behavior of agents a, t, b is represented by the processes A, T , B, where
A
def
= [ca ! c] [c !x]0, T
def
= [ca ? c] [cb ! c]0, B
def
= [cb ? c] [c ? y]P.
The SP is represented by the process Sys
def
= (Ac, T, B)ca,cb .
A formal description of integrity and secrecy of the SP is represented by
propositions (2) and (4), where ˜Sys
def
= (Ac, T, B˜)ca,cb , B˜
def
= [cb ? c] [c ? y
′] [y = x]P.
3.3 A passing of an encrypted message
Third example is a SP, which involves agents a and b having a common key k
(only a and b know k), a and b can encrypt and decrypt messages by this key
using a symmetric encryption system. The SP is as follows:
– a sends b a ciphertext k(x) through an open channel c,
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– b receives the ciphertext, decrypts it, stores the extracted message x in the
variable y, then behaves as a process P .
This SP is represented by the diagram
✲
a b
P
c : k(x)
.
A behavior of agents a and b is represented by the processes A and B, where
A
def
= [c ! k(x)]0, B
def
= [c ?k(y)]P , and the SP is represented by Sys
def
= (A,B)k.
A formal description of the properties of integrity and secrecy of the SP is
represented by (2) and (4), where ˜Sys
def
= (A, B˜)k, B˜
def
= [c ? k(y′)] [y = x]P.
An integrity property of the SP is proposition (2), which in this case has the
form ([c ! k(x)]0, [c ?k(y)]P )k ≈ ([c ! k(x)]0, [c ?k(y
′)] [y = x]P )k, and can be
proven with use of theorem 3. To prove the secrecy property we prove implication
(4). With use of theorem 3 it is not so difficult to prove that (3) and the premise
of implication (4) imply Sys ≈ [y = x]P ≈ [y = x′]P, that proves (4).
3.4 Wide-Mouth Frog
A SP Wide-Mouth Frog (WMF) is intended for a passing of an encrypted
message k(x) from an agent a to an agent b with use of a trusted agent t, open
channels ca, cb, c, and keys ka, kb, k, where ka should be known only to a and
t, kb should be known only to b and t, and k should be known only to a, b and
t. This SP is represented by the diagram
✲
✲
✲
a t b
P
ca : ka(k)
cb : kb(k)
c : k(x)
A behavior of agents a, t, b is represented by processes A, T,B, where
A
def
=
(
[ca ! ka(k)] [c ! k(x)]0
)
k
, T
def
= [ca ? ka(kT )] [cb ! kb(kT )]0,
B
def
= [cb ? kb(kB)] [c ? kB(y)]P. The SP is represented by Sys
def
= (A, T,B)ka,kb .
A formal description of the properties of integrity and secrecy of the SP is
represented by the propositions (2) and (4), where
˜Sys
def
= (A, T, B˜)ka,kb , B˜
def
= [cb ? kb(kB)] [c ? kB(y
′)] [y = x]P.
Graph representations of processes involved in Sys have the following form:
– process A:
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1
✓
✒
✏
✑A2✲ ✲
ca ! ka(k) c ! k(x)
– process T :
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕T 0
✓
✒
✏
✑T 1
✓
✒
✏
✑T 2✲ ✲
ca ? ka(kT ) cb ! kb(kT )
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– process B:
✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕B0
✓
✒
✏
✑B1
✓
✒
✏
✑P✲ ✲
cb ? kb(kB) c ? kB(y)
– process (A, T ):✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0T 0
✓
✒
✏
✑A0T 1
✓
✒
✏
✑A0T 2
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T 0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T 1
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T 2
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T 0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T 1
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T 2
ca? ka(kT ) ca? ka(kT ) ca? ka(kT )
cb ! kb(kT ) cb ! kb(kT ) cb ! kb(kT )
ca ! ka(k)
ca ! ka(k)
ca ! ka(k)
c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
kT = k
❄ ❄ ❄
❄ ❄ ❄
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❥
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
✲
(the diagonal transition in the diagram corresponds to a joint execution of
the action ca ! ka(k) of A, and the action ca? ka(kT ) of T ),
– process (A, T,B):
A2T 0PA1T 0PA0T 0P
A2T 0B1A1T 0B1A0T 0B1
A2T 0B0A1T 0B0A0T 0B0
A2T 1PA1T 1PA0T 1P
A2T 1B1A1T 1B1A0T 1B1
A2T 1B0A1T 1B0A0T 1B0
A2T 2PA1T 2PA0T 2P
A2T 2B1A1T 2B1A0T 2B1
A2T 2B0A1T 2B0A0T 2B0
ca!ka(k) c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
ca!ka(k) c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
ca!ka(k)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
ca!ka(k) c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
ca!ka(k) c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
ca!ka(k)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
ca!ka(k) c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
ca!ka(k)
c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
ca!ka(k)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
k
B
=
k
T
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
k
B
=
k
T
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
k
B
=
k
T
k
T =
k
k
T =
k
k
T =
k
this diagram has diagonal transitions, related to a joint execution of
• action cb ! kb(kT ) of (A, T ), and action cb? kb(kB) of B (transitions of the
form A0T 1B0 → A0T 2B1, A1T 1B0 → A1T 2B1, A2T 1B0 → A2T 2B1,
labelled by kB = kT ), and
• action c ! k(x) of (A, T ), and action c? kB(y) of B (transitions of the form
A1T 0B1 → A2T 0P , A1T 1B1 → A2T 1P , A1T 2B1 → A2T 2P , labelled by
kB(y) = k(x)),
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Process Sys
def
= (A, T,B)ka,kb has the same graph representation as the above
process (A, T,B). Its initial state is A0T 0B0.
First reduction of Sys is based on an applying of theorem 4 for the cases
– the edge is A0T 0B0 ✲
ca?ka(kT )
A0T 1B0 , DA0T 0B0 = {ca, cb, c}, and
– the edge is A0T 0B0 ✲
cb?kb(kB)
A0T 0B1 , DA0T 0B0 = {ca, cb, c}.
Removing the above edges and all nodes and edges which become unreachable
from A0T 0B0 will result the graph
A2T 0PA1T 0P
A2T 0B1A1T 0B1
A2T 0B0A1T 0B0A0T 0B0
A2T 1PA1T 1P
A2T 1B1A1T 1B1
A2T 1B0A1T 1B0
A2T 2PA1T 2P
A2T 2B1A1T 2B1
A2T 2B0A1T 2B0
c!k(x)
c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
ca!ka(k)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
c!k(x)
c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
c!k(x)
c!k(x)
c?
kB
(y
)
c?
kB
(y
)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
c!k(x)
c b
?k
b
(kB
)
kB(y
) = k
(x)
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
k
B
=
k
T
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
ca?ka(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
cb!kb(kT )
k
B
=
k
T
k
T =
k
This graph also can be reduced with use of theorem 4 for the following cases:
– the edge is A1T 0B0 ✲
cb?kb(kB)
A1T 0B1 , DA1T 0B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k)},
– the edge is A1T 1B0 ✲
cb?kb(kB)
A1T 1B1 , DA1T 1B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k)},
– the edge is A2T 0B0 ✲
cb?kb(kB)
A2T 0B1 , DA2T 0B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k), k(x)},
– the edge is A2T 1B0 ✲
cb?kb(kB)
A2T 1B1 , DA2T 1B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k), k(x)}.
Removing the above edges and all nodes and edges which become unreachable
from A0T 0B0 will result to the graph
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✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T1B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T2B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T1B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T1B1
ca? ka(kT ) ca? ka(kT )
cb ! kb(kT )
cb ! kb(kT )
ca ! ka(k) c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
kT = k
❄ ❄
❄ ❄
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❥
✲ ✲
✲
✲
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T2B1
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T2P ✓
✒
✏
✑A2T2B1c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
✲
✲
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T2P
 ✒
 ✒
 ✒
 ✒
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✿
cb? kb(kB)
c?kB(y)
cb? kb(kB)
c? kB(y)
kB = kT kB = kT
y = x
Third step of reduction is based on a use of theorem 4. It is not so difficult
that there is a labelling for the process presented by the above graph:

DA0T 0B0 = {ca, cb, c},
DA1T 0B0 = DA1T 1B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k)}
DA2T 0B0 = DA2T 1B0 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k), k(x)}
DA1T 2B0 = DA1T 2B1 = DA1T 2B2 = {ca, cb, c, ka(k), kb(kT )},
DA2T 2B0 = DA2T 2B1 = DA2T 2P = {ca, cb, c, ka(k), kb(kT ), k(x)},

bA0T 0B0 = bA1T 0B0 = bA2T 0B0 = ⊤,
bA1T 1B0 = bA2T 1B0 = bA1T 2B0 = bA2T 2B0 = (k = kT ),
bA1T 2B1 = bA2T 2B1 = (k = kT ) ∧ (kT = kB),
bA2T 2P = (k = kT ) ∧ (kT = kB) ∧ (x = y).
On the reason of theorem 4, the edge A1T 2B1 ✲
c?kB(y)
A1T 2P in the last dia-
gram can be removed, because bA1T 2B1 ≤ (kB = k), and (k ∈ DA1T 2B1) = ⊥.
The result of such removing is the process below:✓
✒
✏
✑
✗
✖
✔
✕A0T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T1B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T2B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T0B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T1B0
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T1B1
ca? ka(kT ) ca? ka(kT )
cb ! kb(kT )
cb ! kb(kT )
ca ! ka(k) c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
c ! k(x)
kT = k
❄ ❄
❄ ❄
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❥
✲ ✲
✲
✲
✓
✒
✏
✑A1T2B1
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T2B1c ! k(x) ✲
✓
✒
✏
✑A2T2P
 ✒  ✒
 ✒
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✿
cb? kb(kB) cb? kb(kB)
c? kB(y)
kB = kT kB = kT
y = x
It is not so difficult to prove that the property bA2T 2P ≤ (x = y) and the
equivalence [y = x] [y = x]P ≈ [y = x]P imply Sys ≈ S˜ys.
The secrecy property is a direct consequence of the integrity property.
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